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The briefest form of this rebuttal is contained in the follovring three obser- 
vations: 
?hare  is nothing  eas i e r  t h a n  a so lved  p r ob l em [ I ] .  
lb misunder s tand ing  of the m e a n i n g  of ener gy  model ing  is colossal .  
AT the hear t  of the i s s u e  is the old controversy  "s o f t  v e r s u s  hard e n e r g y  
paths". 
Before we elaborate on these observations it is appropriate to briefly describe 
the overall structure of the IlASA energy study, "Energy in a Knite World" [2], 
as this provides the proper factual basis for understanding the study's objec- 
tives. methods and Undings. We regard this as ecsential since Keepin's critique 
admittedly concentrates only on one part of the study, namely the quantitative 
analysis and in doing so is a fundamental shortcoming of his critique. 
The IIASA study consisted of a number of strata. I t  began necessarily with 
the goal of defining the nature of the energy problem, the proper temporal and 
spatial framework in which it should be viewed, and other leading factors. This 
included a rcenariette of rcenariettes: figure 1-5 in [21R illustrates the 
expected evolution of the  world population over the period 1975-2030. Currently 
the world population is some 4 billion and the average global per capita energy 
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Where appropriate re  use throughout this rebuttal the notation of the  IL4SA energy study 
E n e r a  in a Finite World [2]. 
consumption is 2 kWyr/yr, resulting in a total energy consumption of some 
8 Wyr/yr. If as anticipated the population in 2030 is some 8 billion people, 
total consumption would be 16 lWyr/yr if the average per capita consumption 
remains constant. If the per capita consumption rises to 3 respectively 
5 kWyr/yr, the total consumption would be 24 respectively 40 'Z?Nyr/yr. These 
are straightforward calculations that do not even require the "back of an 
envelope". The conclusions are indeed sweeping. In order to properly assess 
their implications and thereby the degree of plausibility, one has to disaggre- 
gate by going into detail. 
The &st stratum of the M A  study addreszed the question of resources, 
fossil as well as nuclear, solar and renewables. The method adopted was to 
stretch considerations to the limit in determining the mere existence of such 
resources. without considering such constraints as prices or existing technolo- 
gies. The identified upper limits were at times surprising and in all instances 
educational. For example, in the case of soft solar energy-that is local and 
decentralized solar energy, the maximum supply potential globally is 1- 
2 'TWyr/yr of energy. For nuclear energy the situation with respect to uranium 
resources could be viewed in the same finite manner as, say, for oil resources 
except when the principal of breeding is engaged which changes the picture 
radically. 
A t  the second stratum the analysis focused on the  constraints, primarily 
those of a global nature. T i e  was found to be a formidable constraint. As his- 
tory has shown the transition from one technology to another as well as major 
infrastructural changes require time, which on a global scale could be as much 
as 100 years. The study also looked into how the requirements for water, 
energy, land., material, and man-power associated with energy installation's 
could constrain the build-up and maintenance of such facilities. Large-scale 
solar power facilities, for instance, require, say, 50 kg per square meter of steel 
and concrete, which is a hard undertaking. The constraints posed by the cli- 
mate system were studied in greater detail. The disposal of waste heat appears 
to be a non-problem globally, whereas the carbon dioxide problem poses prob- 
ably a serious threat  to the global climate system over the long term. Among 
the other constraints considered were the issues of standard setting and risk 
management. Here it is important to reflect the nature of IIASA: I t  is an inter- 
national institute where East, West. North and South come together to deal 
impartially and scientifically with civilization problems irrespective of political 
and to a large extent social differences. Accordingly the intent is to deal with 
problems mostly on a factual basis and not so much with questions of percep- 
tions of a given society. 
It is only a t  the third stratum that the IIASA study undertook the task of 
balancing energy supply and demand. This involved the method of quantitative 
scenario writing by means of mathematical models. This was done for the world 
regions* that comprise the globe: "Energy in a Finite World. Here the objec- 
tive w a s  clearly to understand to the degree possible the interaction of the 
energy paths in one region with the energy paths of all of the regions. The 
objective was not to conduct a detailed analysis for, say, the OECD countries in 
harmony with the availability of many statistical data there and to ignore the 
energy situation in other world regions such as Africa and Southeast Asia. Thus 
it was necessary to opt for a method that by its very nature enabled one to 
grasp the situation in the OECD countries as well as, say in Africa, Southeast 
Asia, and the planned economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and to 
view these From a globally consistent perspective. nASA was particularly suited 
Region I (North America), Region II (Eastern Europe and Soviet Union), Region III (Western 
Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, South Mfica), Region lV (Latin America), Re- 
gion V (Africa and South-East Asia, Region VI (Piddle East and North Atnca) and Region W 
(China and other Asian centrally plcnned economies). 
for this endeavor; more will be said about this modeling when we deal with the 
above mentioned observations. 
What is important here is the  fact that  after a further stratum, where we 
gained certain perspectives from this balancing of supply and demand (e-g. on 
reconsiderations of technologies, dn energy densities, land-use and settlement 
p a t t e n s ,  as  well as on the hard/soft controversy). it is in Part VI of 121, tha t  the 
IIASA study then undertook the  essential and complex task of synthesis. This 
involved the  findings of both the quantitative and the qualitative analyses that  
comprised the UASA study. The assessments and implications of the study are 
reported in Part V1 of "Energy in a n n i t e  World" and cover the major elements 
of the  energy problem: I t  is therefore regrettable that  Keepin has elected to 
view the IlASA study only through the  lens of the TIASA scenarios and thus to 
neglect the rest of t he  study in which the scenarios a re  embedded. 
Let us now elaborate on our observation: "There is nothing easier than a 
solved problem". 
One should recall the situation of the early seventies after the f i s t  oil 
price shock To most experts and observers the energy problem appeared to be 
opaque. Generally speaking, only a limited number of aspects had come under 
scrutiny such as the oil market  of the  OECD countries or the electricity market 
in the  FRG. Questions as to the  nature of the  energy problem as a whole and to 
what was a t  stake remained open. In the US for example, this period witnessed 
"Project Independence" [3] and its related analysis which made extensive use of 
large energy models. There was also the lengthy and tedious study known as 
the CONAES Report of the  United States National Academy of Sciences [4]. As to  
the problems in, say, Asia o r  Latin America there was the input/output study 
"The Future of the World Economy" [5] conducted under the  leadership of W. 
Leontief. This was meant t o  address mostly the problems of the developing 
countries. and to take into account the  political goals of the  "Group of 77" as 
expressed a t  several United Nations Conferences [e.g. 61. During this period 
growth rates  of the world economy as  high as 5 percent per year were under 
consideration. The fact tha t  such  figures are  simply not discussed today 
reflects the major changes in t he  conditions and perceptions tha t  have 
occurred since the early and mid-seventies, when ' the TIASA energy study was 
conceived. Clearly, this study and  others have contributed t o  a deeper under- 
standing of the energy problem and in particular of its global aspects. W e  have 
gained knowledge and insights and  t o  that  extent the  problem has been 
resolved. 
A major component of these analyses was energy modeling. But the 
misunderstanding of the  purpose of such modeling is often colossal. This 
appears to  be the case particularly for Keepin. 
Briefly, there a re  three ways of using mathematical models: 
(1) Mathematical models can be used for prediction and forecasting. The prin- 
cipal example of this is in t h e  field of physics. Once a law of nature is 
known. i t  is possible to predict the state of d a i r s  as described by this law 
a t  time t l  when a previous s ta te  a t  t ime tO is known. This kind of modeling 
has formed the  consciousness of man since the  days of enlightening, and 
many scientific disciplines besides physics have tried to follow similar 
lines. 
(2) Mathematical models can be also used to describe complex and short-range 
t rends even when the laws of nature or i ts equivalent a re  not known. A 
case in point is econometrics. By evaluating intelligently t ime series of 
past data, one can forecast within limits certain economic trends. While 
inherent shortcomings a re  admitted, i t  is by and large possible to apply 
such econometric modeling over a period of a few years. The goal here is 
is to grasp the features of the one  future that is to come. 
(3) Mathematical models can also be used to describe in a consistent way 
scenarios of evolution and this means not the one future to come but 
rather  several conceivable futures. The models are  then used not for fore- 
casting but for the maintenance of consistency and thereby for consistent 
disaggregation. A s  observed earlier, when dealing with such complex prob- 
lems as  the energy problem, i t  is generally not enough to make single 
sweeping and simple observations. Disaggregation then acts as a tool for 
understanding and determining the degree of plausibility. In this sense, 
the  mathematical models serve as  a brush for painting an overall picture 
whose observed pattern enhances ones understanding of what is plausible 
and what is not. It is for this reason that we consider such modeling a 
craft and not a science or an art. 
Keepin's misunderstanding is therefore colossal as he seems to reach out for a 
mixture of modeling of the first and the second type, while in the  I W A  study 
the modeling was meant  to be of the third type. 
- 
Keepin's perception of the linear programming (LP) model MESSAGE [7] 
demonstrates this error even further. MESSAGE was used primarily to  organize 
and process a large se t  of input data consistently for many cases and for the 
various world regions of the I U S A  study. This was done while fully recognizing, 
among others, the  following two features  of LP models in general: 
- The solutions are flip-flop in nature: the slightest advantage of one path 
over another makes the solution flip in spite of the fact that  reality is in 
most cases not tha t  way. 
- Solutions become obvious-if not trivial-once they have been identified 
Indeed. the solutions of an LP problem lie on tbe edges of linear manifolds 
of the active constraints. Once they have been identified. i t  is trivial to 
follow them. But first they must  be identified. I t  is therefore besides the 
point to speak of analytical emptiness. 
Keepin has reinvented both known features. Indeed: m e r e  *is nothing easier 
than a solved problem. But the educational benefits that  went along with this 
problem solving process and the richness of the information gained from the  
disaggregation are  lost when a scenario is replaced by a "scenariette". Produc- 
ing a "scenariette" was simply not the point. Had this been the intent  we would 
have ended with the scenariette of scenariettes described a t  the beginning of 
the article. Specifically, an important finding of the study is that  the  feasibility 
window is a narrow one; i t  is highly determined by constraints. When looking 
not a t  an infinite world as often perceived by single large nations, but a t  a finite 
world which reflects the interdependencies of-all nations, there are  indeed only 
narrow feasibility windows for dealing with the  energy problem over the next 
fifty years. This communicates a kind of emergency quite in contrast  to  the  
relaxed attitudes that  are characteristic of much of today's thinking. 
Indeed, the information gained through analyses enriched the  picture. 
That is particularly t rue for the evaluation of shadow prices and elasticities as 
given in Chapter 15 of Energy in a Finite World [2] (see in particular Tables 15- 
1, 15-5, 15-6, 15-7, 15-9, 15-11). Contrary to their function in econometric 
modeling, these prices and elasticities a re  outputs not inputs and can be used 
to monitor t he  nature of the scenarios. But we note: They do not show up in 
Keepin's scenariettes and particularly so when the allocation of oil and coal 
across world regions must  be analyzed (see Chapter 17 [2], page 548 ff). 
The IIASA study evaluated the  features of energy demand. The method 
chosen was to account for the end uses of energy as these can be approached in 
terms of the requirements of human beings. Clearly, i t  is impossible to predict 
the prices of energy in 50 years from now and their relative ordering. I t  is par- 
ticularly difficult to project energy demand in such world regions as Africa and 
Southeast Asia. But i t  is possible to account for the energy requirements of 
human beings, a t  least in so far as one can anticipate certain life styles. Here it 
was even more drastic to disaggregate and to  determine thereby plausibility. 
Attention should be paid to the details of energy demand as given in Chapter 16 
of Energy in a Finite World [2] (see i n  particular Tables 16-5, 16-6, 16-9, 16-10, 
16-1 1). Some results were especially surprising. For instance, it became 
apparent that despite efficiency improvements and other conservation meas- 
ures t h e  provision and use of liquid fuels is a particular bottleneck and can 
therefore be labeled the problem within the  problem. In Keepin's scenariettes 
the  use of electricity and liquid fuel are  simply used as a starting point. We 
a s k  why not room heating or industrial uses of energy? This again illustrates 
the fact tha t  there is nothing easier than a solved problem. Another aspect of 
the analysis concerned specific energy intensities (in Watts/dollar/yr as  given 
in Figures 16-5 and 16-6 of [2]). They too function as a powerful tool for moni- 
toring the  consistency and plausibility of the llASA scenarios. Again, they do 
- 
not become apparent in scenariettes. 
The set of IIASA models also contains the further step of the IMPACT [a] 
model tha t  uses an input/output approach to  determine the feedback of energy 
investments to the  rest  of the economy. In the early 1970s this was assumed to 
be a major factor. Indeed had not most  people concluded that the rise in the oil 
prices had shaken the rest of the world economy. But then the analyses 
pointed to the effect tha t  was labeled by Alan Manne as  the rabbit and the 
elephant [9], the  rabbit being the energy sector and the elephant the rest of 
the economy. They are of radically different size and i t  is difficult to conclude 
from the  rabbit to the elephant. Macroeconomically this does not lead to tangi- 
ble insights. If such a relationship is to be considered valid i t  must be proven 
on a much more subtle level, which includes to a large extent a s t ratum of 
business investments, institutional behavior, and political expectations. This 
was outside the scope of the IIASA study. Given the fact that  such feedbacks 
from energy to economy were macroeconomically not tangible, it made no 
sense to close the loop of models formally. This is one major objection of Kee- 
pin. But the IlASA study states clearly in Energy in a Finite World [2] on page 
403/404: 
"Finally, a macroeconomic model could accept exogenous assump- 
tions about demographics and institutional parameters such as pro- 
ductivity, taxes, and trade and could calculate the investment and 
consumption rates consistent with the costs from IMPACT. This could 
allow assessment of the magnitude of change in, for example. the capi- 
tal output-ratio if and when energy becomes increasingly capital 
intensive. This in turn could enable both a recheck of the original 
estimates of GDP for each region and a reentering the iterative pro- 
cess. MACRO [10,11] is being revised and adapted for these purposes; 
i t  was not used in obtaining the results presented in this book." 
The above described formalized iteration process would be possible for an 
analysis of the OECD countries. Project LINK [12] comes closest to it but does 
not deal with energy as a variable explicitly. But to  adopt this process with 
energy as an explicit variable for the OECD countries as well as for the Soviet 
Union and the developing regions was beyond the resource capacity of the IIASA 
energy team. What then followed were nonforrnalized judgments made at the 
interface of the various models of the IIASA model set. In Keepin's appraisal he 
observes: 
"Indeed various key assumptions were no doubt modified during the 
course of scenario development but this was an  informal undocu- 
mented process carried out in the heads of the analysts rather than 
the systematic procedure suggested in Figure 2 [of Keepin's appraisal] 
and in many statements in the documentation." 
We consider this a virtue. not a vice, and reply specifically as follows: 
( 4  We never maintained that the model loop was formally closed (see 
Energy in a Finite World. [2], page 403/404). 
(b) Obviously the documentation was good enough for Keepin to be able 
. 
to evaluate the runs and to produce scenariettes. 
( 4  The procedure was truly systematic: it made explicit use of the 
results of the several strata of the study as described above. 
I t  is important to bear in mind the sequence of events. The research activi- 
ties of the first two strata were completed before the modeling work began. 
Thus, the inputs to the modeling exercise were determined within these 
strata's research activities and  not as Keepin claims "tentative predictions and 
arbitrary assumptions that have not been carefully substantiated or tested" 
(Keepin's appraisal, page 53). 
Within the context of the IIASA study Energy in a Finite World one purpose 
of mathematical modeling was to ensure calculational consistency. Keepin 
himself has proven the necessity of deploying mathematical models for calcula- 
tional consistency. In an earlier discourse at IlASA [13] Keepin showed that the 
domestic coal extraction in MESSAGE for Region 111 (Western Europe, Japan. Aus- 
tralia, New Zealand, Israel, South Africa) followed neatly the maximum extrac- 
tion constraint (an input to the model) over the entire 50 year study horizon. 
But the heterogeneous composition of Region 111 especially called for the 
specification of extraction constraints tha t  accounted for that  heterogeneity. 
Otherwise Australian and South African coal would have been considered 
entirely a domestic resource of Western Europe. Furthermore maximum coal 
production ceilings for Western Europe had to be determined by coal experts. 
The sum of these constraints combined for Region I11 provided only then an 
upper limit for domestic coal production as shown in Appendix B Table 4 (p. 60) 
of Keepin's paper. Coal import ceilings were patterned along similar considera- 
tions. The willingness-to-export of other regions as well as the potential tran- 
sport and harbor capacities needed for handling large volumes of coal at  either 
end of the trading regions had to be considered in determining of the actually 
applied numerical values. Once this painstaking exercise was completed the 
calculation was indeed straightforward. Keepin calls this a simplistic transfor- 
mation of assumptions into outputs. But he can claim this only after others 
have completed the painstaking task of quantifying the inputs for him. Indeed 
such modeling forces the systematic organization of otherwise overwhelming 
amounts of data. Then one must observe again: There is nothing easier than a 
solved problem. 
But this is not the only argument at  this point of our rebuttal. Refeking 
again t o  the discourse with Keepin at  IIASA concerning the robustness of the 
IIASA scenarios, Keepin argued that  by a minor change in the levelized costs for 
electricity generation of Region 111 in favor of coal, e.g. by increasing the cost 
for nuclear power by a certain percent, essentially the entire gap between 
hydro-power and the electricity demand curve would be filled by coal. This 
back-of-the-envelope calculation leads to a definite misperception of the actual 
constraints. How can the system switch entirely to coal when in fact domestic 
coal production and.coal imports have already reached their maximum levels? 
Here the  levelized costs no longer matter:  an expansion of coal consumption is 
simply infeasible given the constraints. It is these calculous checks that  
demonstrate the extreme usefulness of the energy models within the analysis 
as  Keepin himself experienced. 
But there are other examples of the usefulness of the IIASA models. as for 
instance when checking Keepin's scenariettes. In the following we concentrate 
on Figures 15a and 15b of Keepin's appraisal (see pages 38 to 40). Kgure 15a 
shows the electricity generation for Region I, IIASA Low Scenario. Keepin main- 
tains tha t  a 16% increase in the costs of nuclear power, i.e Light Water Reactors 
(LWRs) and Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs), and a simultaneous expansion of the 
coal extraction limit by 7% leads to an entire abolishment of nuclear generated 
electricity by the year 2030 (see Figure 15b). Taking this statement at  face 
value we incorporated these modifications into the MESSAGE model and reran 
the Region I I M A  Low Scenario. Some 5 minutes later  we obtained the model 
output as shown in Figure 1: Clearly. a 16% increase in nuclear costs had to 
show an impact on the model solution, and coal's contribution to electricity 
generation increased indeed. But in contrast to Keepin's calculations nuclear 
technologies were still part of the supply picture. According to the IlASA Low 
Scenario in 2030 coal-generated electricity was 51.75 GW(e)yr/yr; as Table 1 
shows, in the modified scenario coal-generated electricity has increased to 
382 GW(e)yr/yr a t  the expense of LWRs and FBRs (indeed down from 
190 GW(e)yr/yr to 123 GW(e)yr/yr (LWR) and From 301 GW(e)y-r/yr to 
37 GW(e)yr/yr (F'BR) respectively) but nuclear energy did not vanish: The 
expansion of nuclear from some 42 GW(e)yr of electricity in 1980 to 160 GW(e)yr 
(LWR + F'BR) in 2030 prevailed. Thus one cannot disregard this result nor can 
one legitimately claim that  nuclear "disappears entirely" (Xeepin's appraisal, 
page 40). 
In seeking the explanation for the striking difference between the IIASA 
findings and Keepin's calculations, we resolved this contradiction by analyzing 
Keepin's data in his Appendix E. Here Keepin's assumed modest 7% increase of 
the coal extraction constraint turned out to be almost 40% by 2030 (see 
Table 2): The maximum extraction constraint of 2000 GWyr/yr (IIASA Low 
Scenario) was actually raised by Keepin to 2788 GWyr/yr, certainly not a minor 
change. To call a model response to a 16% increase in nuclear costs and a 40% 
expansion of the coal extraction constraint "structurally brittle with respect to 
minor changes in various assumed input data" (see Keepin's appraisal page 52) 
is untenable. Furthermore, to put  this level of coal extraction into perspective, 
we note that  Keepin's coal extraction level is even slightly higher than the  
rather optimistic upper coal extraction level of the  HASA High Scenario. In 
other words, Keepin disregards the economic setting of a "low growth" scenario 
and its implications for t h e  development of coal mining and coal handling 
infrastructures. More importantly, t he  increase in  actual coal consumption 
compared to the IIASA Low Scenario amounts to 71%. In te rms  of primary 
energy consumption of Region I this implies a 84% dependence on coal by the 
year 2030 (see Table 3 and Figure 2)! 
The 7% increase in coal extraction q;oted by Keepin was found to be based 
on cumulations of t h e  potential use of coal as determined by the constraints of 
the IlASA Low Scenario. That is: Keepin accumulates the maximum potential 
coal production of t he  IIASA Low Scenario (see Keepin's appraisal Appendix E. 
page 136) and confronts this figure with the coal requirements of his 
scenariette approach. This comparison results indeed in the 7% difference. But 
the correct comparison should have encompassed the  actual cumulative coal 
consumption of the IIASA Low Scenario and the coal requirements of his 
scenariette. In this case the  difference then is striking: Keepin's scenariette 
requires some 70% more  coal than would actually be used in the IIASA Low 
Scenario. 
Again we reflected Keepin's modifications in MESSAGE. The results are sum- 
marized in Figure 3. Needless to say that  this took some 5 minutes and pro- 
duced better calculous consistency than Keepin's scenariette. In spite of his 
attempts t o  eliminate nuclear from his scenariette his arbitrary assumptions 
failed to do this properly: here too some 17 GW(e)yr of nuclear generated elec- 
tricity survived this nuclear termination scenario. Again. we stress t h a t  such 
modeling forces t he  systematic organization of otherwise overwhelming 
amounts of data. 
A further case in point is the competition between the  FBRs and the LWRs 
as modeled in MESSAGE. Yes, the  crossing of prices is flat, ra ther  than steep. 
But this has a substantive background and  i s  therefore not an artifact. In the  
f is t  stratum, where in Chapter 4 of [2] the nuclear potential is explored, i t  is 
explained tha t  eventually this will occur as  the use of uranium resources in 
LWRs only would be possible through 2020 or 2030 but not much longer. Guided 
by the  insights from other s t ra ta  of t h e  IlASA energy study, we did not  want to 
produce formal results that  would be meaningless beyond the year 2030, the 
en'd point of our formal modeling process. Thus the  robustness of this energy 
path does not become apparent when one considers only the s t ratum of energy 
modeling separately. It is apparent, however, when the study findings a r e  con- 
sidered as a whole, as was done in  Pa r t  VI of Energy in a Finite World [ z ] .  
The same reasoning applies to  the problem of environmental protection. 
In his appraisal Keepin observes: 
"One of the robust conclusions drawn from this scenarios is tha t  t h e  
world will consume "unprecedented amounts" of dirty fossil fuels such 
as  tar  sands and oil shales. In addition "coal use shows a tremendous 
increase, by as much as  a factor of five" (HUele, 1983a). It is ack- 
nowledged that  such policies would entail severe consequences: 
"environmental problems raised to the second or third power of what 
we normally envisage will be involved" (Hiifele, 1983a). However, as  
discussed above, no explicit environmental constraints are accounted 
for in these scenarios. Nevertheless, this conclusion is claimed to be 
robust." 
We respond: 
Yes i t  is robust and is a major point of Part  VI, Chapter 25 [ z ]  where 
the  synthesis is provided (see in particular page 804 f). But this was 
neglected by Keepin. I t  was simply not the point to make the energy 
modeling an image of t he  study results. It is just but one tool besides 
others. 
As a mat te r  of fact, after his return to FRG W. Hsfele made i t  a major point a t  
the Kernforschungsanlage JGlich to design what is called a "novel horizontally 
integrated energy system" and to develop i t  [14]. It will permit for "zero emis- 
sions" to  the atmosphere and the hydrosphere and follows the idea of decom- 
posing and thereby cleaning the mass s treams of fossil fuel prior to  comb.us- 
tion. This includes hardware such as the exogenous driven water/methane 
shift reaction, steam coal gasification, electrolysis and others. 
C 
Finally, let  us  address the hear t  of the issue in question. I t  is the old con- 
troversy "soft versus hard energy paths". Yes, we are not soft enough to sug- 
gest to the Have-Nots of the world who live currently with an average per capita 
energy consumption of 0.2 kWyr/yr tha t  they can expect no more than. say, a 
per capita consumption of 0.6 kWyr/yr. while in  North America the average per  
capita consumption is some 10 kWyr/yr and in Europe some 5 kWyr/yr. This is 
no basis for healthy global politics. Ke refuse to prescribe to the Have-Nots how 
to live, especially under these circumstances. Nor do we want to  live with a per 
capita consumption of 0.6 kWyr/yr either. In fact, we want to give all people 
the energy they want and need and let  them choose for themselves the way of 
living they like. We do not want to transform or change societies. What we want 
is a free development that is constrained only to a degree that is unavoidable. 
Indeed, with eight billion people in the year 2030, a per capita energy consump- 
tion of 2 kWyr/yr results in 16 Wyr/yr, 3 kWyr/yr results in 24 TWyr/yr, and 
4 kWyr/yr results in 32 lWyr/yr. Yes, we do And an average global per capita 
consumption figure between 3 kWyr/yr and 4 kWyr/yr a reasonable one and this 
leads to the IIASA energy scenarios. It is still less than the 10 kWyr/yr of North 
America and the 5 kWyr/yr of Europe. 
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Table 1. Region I: Electricity Generation by Technology, 1980-2030 
(GW(e)yr/yr). This scenario is based on an increase in nuclear costs 
of 16% and a raise in the coal extraction of 7% above the IIASA Low 
scenario. 
Year Hydro 
54.87 
58.92 
63.37 
68.34 
73.32 
78.04 
82.49 
86.66 
90.53 
94.09 
97.09 
LWR FBR Coal Solar 
*~dvcoal stands for a new and more efficient generation of coal-fired electricity 
roduction facilities. 
b i l  or gas-hred electricity production laci1itie.s. 
Table 2. Coal Extraction in the IIASA Low and High Scenarios and Keepin's 
Modifications, 1980-2030 (GWyr/yr). 
Low Scenario Scenariette High Scenario 
Maximum plus 7% Maximum 
Annual Actual Maximum Scenariette Annu a1 Actual 
Coal Extrac- Extrac- "No Nuclear" Coal Extract- 
Extraction tion tion Actual Extraction tion 
Table 3. Region I: Primary Energy Consumption or Equivalent (CWyr/yr), 
1980-2030. This scenario is based on an increase in nuclear costs of 
16% and a raise in the coal extraction of 40% for the  period 2025- 
2030 above the IlASA Low scenario. 
Total Tot% 
Year Coal Synf Coal Gas Crude Hydgeo LWR FBR solrena PE 
1980 650 0 650 753 641 148 113 0 8 2314 
1985 800 0 800 715 780 159 174 0 18 2645 
1990 900 0 900 748 880 171 185 0 24 2909 
1995 950 0 950 744 97000 184 206 0 3 1 3087 
2000 1000 0 1000 766 1065 197 247 0 38 3317 
2005 1140 1 1141 759 1090 210 198 0 45 3447 
2010 1226 18 1245 760 1101 222 177 0 52 3568 
2015 1305 97 1403 757 1075 233 141 0 58 3686 
2020 1407 295 1703 697 972 244 129 0 64 3853 
2025 1474 731 2206 699 719 254 102 0 69 4105 
2030 1576 1190 2766 700 452 262 45 0 74 4235 
a Solar and renewables 
Primary Energy: r o n  may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
FBR 
Figure 1 . Region I : Electricity Generation (GW (e) yr/yr) , 
1980-2030. 
  his scenario is based on an increase in nuclear 
costs of 16% and a raise in the coal extraction of 7% 
above the IIASA Low scenario. 
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Figure 2. Region I: Primary Energy Consumption or Equivalent 
(TWyr/yr) , 1980-2030. 
This scenario is based on an increase in nuclear 
costs of 16% and a raise in the coal extraction 
of 40% for the period 2025-2030 above the IIASA 
Low scenario. 
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Figure  3. Region I : E l e c t r i c i t y  Generation (GW ( e )  y r / y r )  , 
1980-2030. 
This  s c e n a r i o  i s  based on an i n c r e a s e  i n  n u c l e a r  
c o s t s  of 16% and a r a i s e  i n  t h e  c o a l  e x t r a c t i o n  
of 40% f o r  t h e  p e r i o d  2025-2030 above t h e  IIASA 
Low scena r io .  
Table 15-1. Summary of scenario energy projections, final energy. 
A.  Finol Energy for 1950 ond 19 75 ond Projections to 2030 (TWyrlyr) 
Hisroricol High Scenorio Low Scenorio 
Region 1950 1975 2000 2030 2000 2030 
I (NA) 0.96 1.87 2.63 3.67 2.26 2.64 
II (SU/EE) 0.36 1.28 2.39 4.1 1 2.1 7 2.95 
Ill (WEIJANZ) 0.55 1.59 3.04 4.38 2.39 2.99 
I V  (LA)  0.05 0.26 1.01 2.64 0.73 1.66 
V (AfISEA) 0.05 0.25 1.06 3.17 0.80 1.88 
V l  (MEINAf) 0.01 0.11 0.58 1.64 0.43 0.87 
V l l  (CICPA) 0.03 0.39 1.23 3.20 0.85 1.59 
World 2.01 5.74 1 1  -93 22.80 9.64 14.56 
B. Finol Energy Growrh Rores for 1950- 19 75 ond Proiecrions ro 2030 (%/yr) 
Historic01 High Scenorlo Low Scenorio 
1950- 
Region 1975 
I (NA) 2.7 
I1 (SUIEE) 5.2 
Il l (WEIJANZ) 4.3 
I V  (LA)  6.8 
V (AfISEA) 6.7 
V l  (ME/NAf) 10.4 
VII (CICPA) 10.8 
World 4.3 3 .O 2.2 2.1 1.4 
Nores: These data for f i nd  energy include nonenergy feedstocks but  exclude noncommercial 
energy such as wood, agriculture and animal waste. See Appendix 1B fo r  the definition and conversion 
of  energy uniu. Estimates o f  historical final energy are taken from Chant (1980). Data and world 
totals are rounded; totals may appear to  not  add exactly. Growth rates were calculated using non- 
rounded data and then rounded t o  one decimal place; t hex  rates may therefore appear to  not apply 
exactly in part A of  the table. 
SOURCE: [2] . 
Table 15-5. Primary energyCDP elasticities, E,  , 1950-2030. 
Historical 
1950- 
Region 1975 
I (NA) 1.03 
II (SUIEE) 0.77 
Ill (WEIJANZ) 0.96 
I V  (LA)  1.28 
V (AflSEA) 1.52 
V l  (ME/NAf) 1.20 
V l l  (CICPA) 1.57 
World 0.99 
High Scenario Low Scenario 
19 75- 2000- 1975- 2000- 
2000 2030 2000 2030 
0.42 0.67 0.36 0.89~ 
0.65 0.67 0.62 0.62 
0.70 0.77 0.65 0.7 3 
1.04 0.98 1.06 0.97 
1.15 1.1 1 1.18 1.19 
1.16 0.96 1.23 1.1 0 
1.06 1.17 0.98 1 .27a 
-- - --- - - - 
?he primary energy-GDP elasticity is unusually high for regions I and V I I  i n  the Low scenario. 
I n  the later time period i n  these regions, demand for liquids must be met f rom coal liquefaction, which 
has significant conversion losses, thus adding to primary energy use. Since the GDP growth is small in 
the Low scenario, the elasticity o f  primary energy use with GDP is increased. I f  these losses are sub- 
tracted from primary energy consumption in 2030, the resulting elasticities are 0.53 and 0.94 for 
regions I and VII ,  respectively. The same effect is present i n  the High scenario for regions I, 11, 111, 
and VII, but is less pronounced in the elasticity because GDP growth is higher. 
Note: Historical values were computed by linear regression on logarithmic transformation o f  
equation (see note, p. 446) using five yearly data (see Chant 1980). Values for the projection period 
result from the scenario data. 
SOURCE: [ 2 ] .  
Table 1 5 4 .  Final energy-GDP elasticities, e f ,  195&2030. 
- -  - - 
A. High Scenorio 
Historic01 
195& 19 75- 1985- 2000- 3015- 
Region 1975 1985 2000 2015 2030 
I (NA) 
ll (SUIEE) 
I l l  (WEIJANZ) 
I V  (LA) 
V ( AfISEA) 
V l  (MEINAf) 
V l l  (CICPA) 
World 
8. Low Sccnorio 
195& 19 75- 1985- 200& 20 15- 
Region 1975 1985 2000 2015 2030 
I (NA) 0.84 0.24 0.38 0.53 0.46 
Il (SUIEE) 0.68 0 5 4  0.57 0.50 0.41 
I l l  (WEIJANZ) 0.84 0.67 0.64 0.60 0.49 
I V  (LA) 1.21 1.10 1.03 0.95 0.88 
V (AfISEA) 1.42 1.19 1.12 1.14 1.06 
V l  (ME/NAf) 1.17 1.21 1.11 1.01 0.93 
V l l  (C/CPA) 1.53 1.02 0.98 0.99 0.90 
World 0.87 0.64 0.73 0.79 0.74 
Note: Historical values were computed by linear regression on logarithmic transformation of 
equation (see note, p. 446) using five yearly data (we Chant 1980). Values for the projection period 
result from the scenario data. 
SOURCE: [ 2 ] .  
Table  15-7. Real pr ices for f i na l  (delivered) energy (1975 $ per  kWyr) .  
Residenrial- 
Industry Transporr Commercial A l l  Secror 
Sector Sector Secror Aggrrgarr 
Region I (NA)  
1972 
1975 
1975-1972 
Region Ill (WEIJANZ) 
1972 62 254 135 113 
1975 92 338 174 159 
1975-1 972 1.48 1.33 1.29 1.41 
Notes: $100 per kWyr is equivalent to $19.40 per barrel o f  o i l  equivalent, $3.34 per mil l ion Btu, 
and $0.01 1 per kwh. These prices are calculated from data contained i n  Hogan (1979). These data 
were taken from a data base assembled by  Pindyck as described i n  Pindyck (1978) and updated 
from several sources by  Hogan. Data on current prices were adjusted for inflation using a GNP de- 
flator; currency conversions were based o n  a purchasing power parity conversion rate. The data 
reported here for region Ill (WEIJANZ) are for  the aggregation o f  data for the four largest energy- 
using countries only: France, F RG, the United Kingdom, and japan. 
SOURCE: [ 2 ]  . 
Table 15-9. Final energy-income and energy-price elasticities. 
Hioh Scenario Low Scenario 
Region 
Income Price 
elas ticity elasricity 
7 B 
Income Price 
elasriciry elasticity 
7 B 
I (NA) 
II (SUIEE) 
Ill (WE/IANZ) 
IV (LA) 
V (Af/SEA) 
V l  (ME/NAf) 
V l  l (C/CPA) 
Note: Final energy price elasticities are all sector aggregates for the period 1975-2030, calculated 
according to the equation (see footnote e) to  be consistent with GDP and f ind energy scenario pro- 
jections and with the assumed range of values for the income ehsticities shown. The historical values 
for 1950-1975 for 7 are given in  Tables 15-5 and 15-6 under the assumption that real prices did not 
change during that period. Thae values are, respectively, 0.84,0.68, and 0.84 for regions I, ll, and Ill 
and 1.21, 1.42, 1.17, and 1.53 for regions IV, V, VI, and VII. The high values for the developing 
regions would not be particularly appropriate for the projection period; the range shown in this 
table would be more appropriate. Note also that the price elasticities of the High scenario are larger 
than those for the Low scenario, because i t  was implied that a higher innovation rate thus favoring 
more energy conservation would go along with the higher growth rates of the High scenario. 
SOURCE: [ 2 ] .  
Table 15-1 1. Projected increases in payments for energy as fraction of GDP. 
A. Hiah Scenario 
Region 
F ind  Final Energy Paymenn for 
GDP Energy Price Energy -G DPa 
- 
I (NA) 4.75 1.96 3.0 1.24 
I I  (SUIEE) 8.23 3.25 3 .O 1.1 8 
Ill (WEIJANZ) 4.90 2.75 2.4 1.35 
IV  (LA)  1050 10.36 3.0 2.96 
V (AflSEA) 10.26 12.56 3.0 3.67 
V l  (MEINAf) 15.36 15.45 3.0 3.02 
V l l  (CICPA) 7.66 8.1 3 3.0 3.18 
B. Low Scenario 
Region 
Final Final Energy Paymenrs for 
GDP Energy Price Energy -GDP' 
I (NA) 2.50 1.41 3.0 1.69 
II (SUIEE) 5.07 2.3 1 3 .O 1.37 
Ill (WEIJANZ) 2.79 1.88 2.4 1.62 
IV  (LA)  6.56 6.49 3.0 2.97 
V (AfISEA) 5.87 7.42 3.0 3.79 
V l  (MEINAf) 6.90 8.19 3.0 3.56 
V l l  (ClCPA) 4.20 4.04 3.0 2.89 
- - -- 
a~rojected energy payments as a fraction of GDP in 2030 relative to energy payments as a fraction 
of GDP in 1975 using 1972 energy prices. For example, i f  energy consumption doubles and price 
triples, then energy payments increase sixfold. But i f  GDP also increases fourfold, then this "pay- 
ments for energy-GDPH index would be 614 = 1.50. 
Nores: Values given are for the year 2030 as a multiple of b a s  year value. GDP and final energy 
are given as projected 2030 values relative to 1975 values. Price increase i s  for final energy (delivered 
to the user) relative to 1972 price levels. 
SOURCE: [ 2 ]  . 
Table 16-5. Household use of electricity, 1975 and scenario assumptions 
(lo3 kWh1household). 
Base High Scenarlo Low Scenario 
Year 
Region 1975 2000 2030 2000 2030 
I (NA)  total electricity 
(96 thermal 
II (SU/EE) total electricity 
(% thermal uses) 
Ill (WEIJANZ) total electricity 
(96 thermal uses) 
I V  ( L A )  total electricity 
(% thermal uses) 
V (Af/SEA) total electricity 
(% thermal uses) 
V I  (ME/NAf) total electricity 
(% thermal uses) 
f hermal uses include air conditioning. 
Notes: Only for  region I (NA)  were sufficient statistics available; for other regions estimates come 
from partial data and/or data for selected countries. Consumption o f  electricity per household for  
specific uses (lighting, electrical appliances) is a direct assumption; consumption for thermal uses 
results f rom separate assumptions o n  useful energy consumption for space heating, water heating, 
cooking, and air conditioning and from assumed penetration o f  electricity in to  these markets. 
SOURCE: [ 2 ] .  
Table 16-6. GDP sectoral shares assumptions (percentage of GDP). 
Region Agriculture industrya Service 
High Scenario 2030 Low Scenario 2030 
Agriculture industrya Service Agrkulture industrya Servlce 
'industry Includes manufacturing, mlnlng, construction, and energy sectors. 
Smurcfs of data for the base year (1975): reflions I, I l ,and Ill- Unlted Nations ( 1 9 7 7 ~ ) ;  reglons IV ,  V ,  and VI-Unlted Natlons (1977b);and data on varlous reglon 
V I  counlrles supplled by the Arab I'und fur Economlc and Soclal Development, Kuwalt. 
SOURCE: [ 2 ] .  
Table 16-9. Projected passenger travel (intercity and urban) and assumed distribution, High scenario. 
Acrivlry A criviry Acrlvlty 
level level level 
(10" Modol spllt (%) ( l o 1 =  Modol split (%) (1 O'l Modol spllt (%) 
DOSS DOSS DOSS 
. - 
Reglon km) Plone Cor 1roin0 Bur km) Plone Cor TrolnO Bus km) Plone Cor 1roin0 Bus 
I (NA)  4.1 4 93 1 2 6.2 12 83 2 3 8.2 2 0  73 3 4 
II (SUIEE) 1.7 11  26  5 1 12 4 .O 13 29 45 13 6.4 I 5  30  4 1 14 
Ill (WEI IANZ)  5.2 3 37 37 2 3 9.2 9 44 27 20  13.8 12 50 20 18 
I V  ( L A )  1.3 1 3 7 5 5 7 4.3 3 45 5 47 10.7 4 49 9 38 
V (Af ISEA) 1 .5 1 2 5 14 6 0  5.2 2 32 11 5 5 16.4 2 39 10 4 9 
V l  (ME/NAf)  0.3 1 2 9 5 6 5 1.6 2 34 9 55 5.6 4 38 I 5  43 
'Train includes urban electric mass transit. 
Sources of  data for 1975: United Nations ( 1 9 7 7 ~ ) ;  lnternatlonal Road Federation (1973, 1976); The Mlddle Eost ond North Afrlco, 1974-1975 (1976); CMEA 
(1976). 
SOURCE: [ 2 ] .  
Table 16-10. Assumptions for automobile ownership and usage in six world 
regions. 
Base High Scenorio Low Scenario 
Year 
A. Auto Ownership 
(auto11 000 pop) 
Region: 
I (NA) 
11 (SUIEE) 
Ill (WEIJANZ) 
I V  (LA)  
V .(Af/SEA) 
V l  (MEINAf) 
8. Intercity and Urban 
Distance Traveled 
(1 0' kmlautolyr)  
Region: 
I (NA)  
II (SUIEE) 
Ill (WEIJANZ) 
I V  (LA)  
V (AfISEA) 
V l  (MEINAf) 
Sources of data for 1975: United Nations (1977~) ;  International Road Federation (1976); U.S. 
Department of  Commerce (1 976). 
SOURCE: 121 .  
Table 16-11. Energy use by automobiles in six world regions. 
Base High Scenario Lou* Scenario 
Year 
1975 2000 2030 2000 2030 Region 
I (NA)  
Energy used b y  can  (GWyrlyr) 
As share o f  total transportation energy (96) 
II (SUIEE) 
Energy used by  can (GWyrlyr) 
As share o f  total transportation energy (%) 
Ill (WEIJANZ) 
Energy used by  cars (GWyrlyr) 
As share of total transportation energy (%) 
I V  ( L A )  
Energy used by  can (GWyrlyr) 
As share o f  total transportation energy (%) 
V (Af/SEA) 
Energy used by cars (GWyrlyr) 
As share o f  total transportation energy (%) 
V l  (ME/NAf) 
Energy used b y  cars (GWyrlyr) 
As share of total transporution energy (%) 
SOURCE: [2]. 
Figure 1-5. Total energy consumption, 1975-2030: three possibilities. The solid lines 
indicate energy consumption; the dashed line indicatesworld population. 
Total 
enwv 
consumption 
(TWvrlvr) 
Popu bt ion 
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Year 
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SOURCE: [ 2 ] .  
Figure 16-5. Energy intensiveness in different world regions, High scenario. 
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SOURCE: [ 2 ] .  
Figure 16-6. Energy intensiveness in different world regions, Low scenario. 
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SOURCE: [ 2 ] .  
